Moldova & Georgia: Post- Post-Soviet Revolution Potential?
In case you hadn’t noticed, there’s been trouble in Moldova and Georgia of late. The reason that both small ex-Soviet states have erupted onto your TV screens (and Risk Watchdog) this week is that both have seen crowds of 10,000+ angry citizens take to the streets of their respective capital cities to protest against their incumbent governments. That’s the streets of Chisinau and Tbilisi, for the real pub quiz buffs amongst you.
In Moldova, the landslide victory (50% of the vote) achieved by the ruling Communist Party in the April 5 general election did NOT go down well with large swathes of the country’s students and young people, who protested to contest the election’s legitimacy. This came despite OSCE and European Parliament observers reporting that the poll met ‘many’ international standards.
Many young Moldovans feel that the administration’s commitment to a pervasive state role in the economy is preventing increases in jobs and living standards, and hampering European integration ambitions. 193 were arrested, more than 100 were injured, and one died as groups of rioters stormed the parliament building (which was set alight) and presidential office over April 6 and 7, smashing windows and throwing bricks at police. The irony of pro-capitalism demonstrators breaking windows and assaulting police was not lost on those of us who endured a commute through the now-vilified City of London during the G20 protests last week.
A similar story is now unfolding in Georgia. Unlike Moldova, Georgia has already had its pro-reform ‘Rose’ Revolution. And President Mikhail Saakashvili is certainly no stranger to riding-out protests, having quashed a demonstration of 15,000 using the security forces in November 2007 and having also weathered a large demonstration in January. But with at least 60,000 rallying outside the parliament building in Tbilisi as I type on April 9 – including members of Saakashvili’s own government! – this is clearly a demonstration on a different scale. Here too, the protestors’ demand is for presidential resignation.
As an avid professional Moldova-watcher (now there’s a chat-up line…), I see three key risks inherent in the present political tensions:
• Relations with Romania – and therefore the EU – could sour further in the short term. President Vladimir Voronin has accused Bucharest of orchestrating the April 6 and 7 protests (Romanian and EU flags were carried by many demonstrators), and has since expelled the Romanian ambassador, barred Romanian journalists, and introduced visas at the western border. This attempt to deflect blame was predictable, but if ties remain frosty, it will further harm Moldova’s political and economic integration with the EU.
• The Moldovan economy could be further harmed by the turmoil, compounding the negative effects of the recession already expected in 2009. With effective policymaking, fiscal management and day-to-day economic activities all likely to suffer in a situation of elevated political tension, GDP and the budget balance could both be harmed. Indeed, ratings agency Fitch warned on April 8 that it could further cut its already-weak ‘B-‘ Moldova credit rating if the current political turmoil persists.
• The government could crack-down on the opposition. This has already occurred to an extent, via criticism of the opposition in state-controlled media and the arrest of nearly 200 protestors. I do not believe that a deeper roll-back of Moldova’s nascent democracy is likely in the medium term, but caution that it is not inconceivable, should further demonstrations cause the Communists’ patience to wear thin.
This all said, there could well be one key positive outcome from the current turmoil: a larger role for the pro-EU, pro-reform opposition is likely to emerge when a new government eventually forms. The Liberal Party, Liberal Democratic Party, and Our Moldova Alliance Party – who between them achieved 35% of the April 5 vote – have all expressed an unwillingness to join a coalition with the Communists. Yet given the reality that the Communists remain the most popular party in Moldova, these three parties are unlikely to form a government themselves any time soon.
A compromise may involve them playing a role in the selection of the new president (Voronin must stand down under the constitution) and thereby shaping policy in a pro-reform direction, which would bode well for Moldova’s political and economic future. This scenario is my (guarded) hunch for the eventual outcome of the current situation, although I caution that it could well not emerge until after a protracted period of political stalemate
My Georgia view is simpler: Saakashvili will eventually lose power as a result of his current unpopularity. But like in Moldova, the fragmentation of the opposition has been their biggest impediment in efforts to win power. So, he may not go today, tomorrow, next week, or this year. But he will go sooner or later. What this will mean for the Georgian political, economic and business environments in the short term is further instability. What it will mean in the longer term, I hope, could be a greater commitment to open political dialogue, a greater willingness to tackle widespread corruption and still-warm ties with the West. But of course, should a successor continue Saakashvili’s authoritarian turn or provoke/suffer a new conflagration with Russia, even this tentatively optimistic outlook could be wrecked overnight. Watch this space…
One last key take-home: the events in Moldova and Georgia show the deep global recession directly impacting politics in two frontier markets of the world economy. If there’s one certainty, it’s that we’ll see more political uncertainty, instability and government collapse as publics vent economic frustration on inept-or-otherwise leaders.
April 14th, 2009 at 11:19 am
Moldova’s Communists have acquiesced to a vote recount, which will take place on April 15. Enough to placate the opposition and convince the rioters the election was fair? Probably not, because a recount will deliver the same outcome. The opposition’s fundamental problem is not that the election was rigged: quite the opposite, their problem is that a party they despise won a landslide in an election that was NOT rigged. Where can they go from there?! Plenty more acrimony before all this is done with, I reckon. That, and a whole load more emigration by the few young, productive people Moldova has left…
April 20th, 2009 at 10:40 pm
Moldova needs it’s young people and the terrible brain drain to return in order for the country to become stabilized. The lack of the basic rule of law is what keeps them away! This is a legal more trhan a political nightmare!