Sino-Islamic Relations Tested By Xinjiang Crackdown
One of the consequences of China’s crackdown on the Uighurs of Xinjiang Autonomous Region is that it could tarnish the country’s standing in the eyes of Muslim nations (and other countries for that matter, but the key point here is that Uighurs are Muslims). This would be a setback for Beijing’s hopes of emerging as a respected global power, differentiated from the US, whose reputation has been undermined by wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Most notably, Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated last week that genocide was being committed in Xinjiang. His comments were all the more surprising, given that Abdullah Gul last month became the first Turkish president to visit China in 15 years. The Chinese rebuttal was swift, pointing out that more Han Chinese had died in the recent Xinjiang riots, and that the region’s Uighur population has increased over the past few decades. Nonetheless, China feels sufficiently concerned about a backlash that it has warned its citizens working in Algeria about possible attacks against them by al-Qaeda operatives in North Africa.
For now, most Muslim countries’ governments will choose to stay quiet about Xinjiang, keeping in mind Beijing’s sensitivity to external interference in its domestic affairs and lucrative trade deals and commercial relations with China. Indeed, China has many allies or otherwise friendly nations in the Muslim world, such as Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan, who will not jeopardise their ties with it. As for the general public’s attitude in those countries, the truth is that the Uighurs do not carry the same emotional appeal as the Palestinians. Nor are tens of thousands dying as they were in Bosnia and Chechnya, which galvanised Muslim opinion against Serbia and Russia, respectively.
Nonetheless, with Muslims in China said to number between 20 million and 100 million (the government probably wishes to play down the number, while Muslim groups tend to play it up – if the latter is true then China is one of the world’s biggest Muslim countries), I suspect that we will hear a lot more about Sino-Islamic relations (both within China and outside) over the coming years. Indeed, let us suppose that China’s rising power prompts a shift towards an activist and interventionist foreign policy that entails active support for repressive governments (perceived or otherwise) and deploying troops in Muslim countries (as the US has done over the past few decades). There would be a risk that some of the anti-Americanism seen in the Middle East and elsewhere could one day be re-directed towards China.
July 16th, 2009 at 10:06 am UTC
I wonder whether this exaggerates the strength of identification with the Uighur cause among Muslims worldwide. Certainly the largely Muslim Central Asian states are willing to co-operate with China on counter-terrorism through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, well aware of the long-standing grievances of China’s Muslim population. The governments of Central Asia fear the effects of the Uighur uprising on their own security and the potential that instability in Xinjiang could bolster their own domestic Islamic insurgencies. Indeed, Kyrgyz troops have in recent years been involved in joint military exercises with the PLA in Xinjiang which have included counter-terrorism operations; the Kyrgyz are culturally the closest of all of the region’s ethno-national groups to the Uighur.
In the wider Muslim world, there has been little interest in ethnic grievances of indigenous Muslim groups. Chechnya had little impact on Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia, for instance. No-one but Algeria cares about Western Sahara and there is little interest in the Somaliland cause. Then there are the revolts in south-east Asia, such as the Islamic unrest in southern Thailand. In short, Muslims - like anyone - generally care about their own back yard. And there’s no way they’d relinquish the opportunities for investment and trade with China for the sake of a few million economically backward and politically marginalised Uighurs.
July 16th, 2009 at 4:25 pm UTC
Thank you for your response. I don’t disagree with your comments, and I believe that this was evident in the original post.
I think one of the complicating factors in this issue is differentiating between government positions and public positions.
So, I largely agree with you that no Muslim government is actively going to jeopardise ties with China for the sake of the Uighurs – although I still find it interesting that Erdogan made such a vocal comment, especially since Turkey favours amicable relations with China. It is unclear whether Erdogan was speaking from an ‘Islamist’ or ‘pan-Turkist’ perspective, but it was still rather provocative.
As for public opinion, as you suggest, I suspect that the Uighurs are too obscure and geographically remote to attract much attention in the mainstream ‘Islamic world’. I use speech marks here because I feel that the term ‘Islamic world’ itself is too fragmented and thus somewhat meaningless, just as would be the term ‘Catholic world’ or ‘Protestant world’. As you say, most people care about their back yard, most of the time. Nonetheless, I believe that Bosnia and Chechnya did attract a lot of criticism in Muslim countries that was directed against Serbia and Russia.
I think the broader point about China having to tread carefully as it expands its overseas influence, including in the ‘Islamic world’, is still valid, though the ramifications may be many years away.
July 17th, 2009 at 10:14 am UTC
I have no explanation for Erdogan’s comments. Pan-Turkist and pan-Islamic sentiment are not particularly strong beyond an extreme minority. Perhaps he was attempting to prove his democratic credentials to Western governments, particularly the EU which has used Turkey’s human rights problems as a barrier to accession. Unlike Central Asia, I don’t think Turkey has much to lose by angering Beijing.