Where Is Pakistan Heading?
Pakistan is one of the most geopolitically important countries in the world today, and how it evolves will affect a whole range of strategic issues. These include:
- The future of political Islam
- The fate of Afghanistan
- The spread of nuclear weapons
- The economic development of South Asia
- The development of energy resources in Central Asia
A stable, democratic and competently-governed Pakistan would be a boon for South and Central Asia, for it would serve as a regional anchor and a secure transport corridor between Iran/the Gulf region and India and between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean (and thence to world markets). Unfortunately, Pakistan is unstable, occasionally undemocratic, and suffers from weak institutions. Last week’s wave of terror attacks, including a siege at the army’s General Head Quarters in Rawalpindi, only reinforces Pakistan’s high risk profile. In addition, its neighbours accuse Pakistan of exporting Islamist militancy to their territory. Of course, things could be a lot worse, and I have thus compiled a short Q & A addressing the most salient issues.
Will militant attacks spread?
Islamist militant attacks are not uncommon in Pakistan, and they have occurred across the country, not just in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Last week’s siege at GHQ in Rawalpindi was a major psychological blow to the authorities, since GHQ is supposed to be a highly secure facility. While the security breach was an embarrassment for the army, the fact that it was able to overpower the militants relatively quickly counts in its favour. The key question is whether militancy will take hold in Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province and its heartland. Radicalisation of big parts of Punjab would raise the stakes substantially.
Will the government’s assault in South Waziristan work?
Pakistan has launched a military offensive in South Waziristan (which borders Afghanistan) to crush a Taliban stronghold that has become a base for Islamist militants. The army’s 30,000-strong assault force outnumbers the militants by around three to one and overwhelmingly outguns them, but the terrain is tricky and the local tribes are deeply hostile to outside forces. Thus, the Pakistani army may fail to deliver a knock-out blow. Instead, they could end up in a war of attrition, one that would not preclude further militant attacks beyond South Waziristan.
On that front, I can envisage a scenario whereby militants maintain attacks in key Pakistani cities for some time, but without bringing about systemic change to the polity. However, this chaos would be enough to scare off many foreign investors, thus undermining the economy. Eventually, after a few years of instability, I would not be entirely surprised to see another military coup, which has been a recurring theme in Pakistan since independence.
How is militancy affecting neighbouring countries?
Afghanistan and Pakistan both accuse each other of exporting Islamist militants to their territory. To some degree they are both right. Afghanistan would prefer that Taliban fighters retreat to Pakistan, while Pakistan would prefer it if they went to Afghanistan. The border regions are lawless, allowing them to become militant havens.
Meanwhile, India and Pakistan are competing for influence in Afghanistan, and New Delhi suspects Islamabad’s hand behind the bombing of its embassy in Kabul on October 8. At the same time, Islamabad suspects that New Delhi is supporting Baluchi separatists in Pakistan. Also noteworthy is that Iran has blamed Pakistani agents of supporting a terror attack in its Sistan-Baluchistan province on Sunday October 18 that killed 42 people, including several Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders. Thus, Pakistan is at the centre of the storm. But the bigger risk would stem from another major terror attack in India, similar to Mumbai in November 2008. If such an attack were tied to Pakistan, this would severely raise regional tensions.
Is Pakistan in danger of becoming an Islamist state?
Not necessarily. Most Pakistanis, while angry at Western policy in the region, do not want their country to become an Islamist state. Support for Islamist parties was weak in the February 2008 general election, with the vast majority of voters backing the establishment parties. In addition, the 600,000-strong army remains a major bulwark against an Islamist takeover. Several thousand militants are still far too few to take over the country. Furthermore, while Pakistan’s ISI intelligence service is suspected of backing militants, this does not mean that it wants an Islamist state. The real danger would come from the military splitting into secular and Islamist factions, a possibility adumbrated in the book 7 Deadly Scenarios.
Is Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal secure?
You’d better hope so. These are the crown jewels of the Pakistani military and are therefore under strict lock and key from seizure by militants, but no-one can 100% guarantee their security. Overall, any breach of nuclear security would need substantial insider backing. Alternatively, the military would have to collapse, but at this time there is little reason to fear the latter scenario.
What will the US do?
The US will continue to prod Pakistan to crack down on Islamist militants, while maintaining its own drone strikes on Pakistani territory. Clearly, any sign that Washington is increasing the geographical scope or intensity of airstrikes would risk further alienating Pakistanis from the US. Another source of tension is the Kerry-Lugar Act that ties substantial US economic assistance to Pakistan to Islamabad’s commitment to fighting terrorism, and firm civilian control over Pakistan’s military. Many Pakistani citizens, legislators, and military officials regard these conditions as intrusive infringements of Pakistan’s sovereignty, and this could sour bilateral relations. Ultimately, the US cannot leave Pakistan out to dry, since Pakistan is just too important on so many fronts.
