There’s a well-known Roman maxim, ‘If You Want Peace, Prepare For War’.

Judging by some potentially dangerous maneuverings taking place on the Korean peninsula, I can only hope that North Korea’s leaders are taking this proverb to heart.

There are several developments which are raising regional tensions right now:

• North Korea has confirmed that it plans to launch a satellite imminently – i.e. test its long-range Taepodong 2 missile, which is theoretically capable of reaching Alaska (watch out, Sarah Palin!).

• North Korea has increased the size of its special operations forces (already the largest in the world) by 50% since 2006 to 180,000. Their prime purpose would be infiltration and sabotage operations in the South.

• The level of hawkish rhetoric from Pyongyang, although not uncommon, has become more shrill than usual.

None of this means that war is imminent. However, my concern is that we could see some sort of armed clash that could heighten tensions even further, and for a more prolonged period of time.

Below, I list potential scenarios:

• Following the Taepodong 2 launch, the US attempts to shoot down the rocket. US Defense Secretary Bob Gates has stated this as a possibility, if the missile heads towards the US. Given that a shootdown would probably be perceived by North Korea as an act of war, some sort of retaliation against US interests would be likely, lest Pyongyang seem completely impotent. On the other hand, if any shootdown failed, the US would be exposed as lacking a credible anti-ballistic missile system.

• North Korea initiates a new naval confrontation with the South in the West Sea. Pyongyang has never recognised the inter-Korean maritime border (the so-called ‘Northern Limit Line’), and previous clashes there in 1999 and 2002 took place in the lucrative crab fishing season in late spring/early summer. Both incidents took place when the South was led by the Pyongyang-friendly liberal, Kim Dae-jung. This time, though, the conservative President Lee Myung-bak would be expected to take a sterner line.

• The North could attempt to attack US surveillance aircraft, which it accuses of routinely violating its airspace. Pyongyang shot down a US spyplane in 1969, killing 31 people. However, more useful for the North’s purpose would be an attempt to capture a US spyplane, similar to the Hainan Island incident of 2001, in which China forced down a US reconnaissance plane and held its crew hostage for almost two weeks.

• Finally, the North could conduct a new nuclear test, following on from its initial test in October 2006, which is widely believed to have fizzled due to technical problems. However, a second test would lack the psychological impact of the first, and since no-one would be killed, there would be no emotional response from the South or the US.

The key risks from points one to three stem from the retaliation factor. Retaliation could lead to counter-retaliation, which in turn could escalate into a cycle of limited destruction. The situation would be especially dangerous if the US initiated a punitive – albeit limited – strike on the North (let us say bomb a Northern missile base). Pyongyang would not know for certain whether this would be a one-off strike or a prelude to a wider attack. Under such circumstances, it might be tempted to take drastic action, with dire consequences.

Ultimately, though, any hawkish moves by North Korea would be counterproductive in that it would make it much harder for President Barack Obama to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards Pyongyang – something which the North actually desires.