Much has been made of how Russia’s recent offensive in Georgia marks its resurgence as a global power. Its invasion came after almost continuous geopolitical reversals for the past 20 years, as evidenced by the following events:

• Military defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989
• Collapse of the USSR in 1991
• Military withdrawal from Central Europe and Germany in the early 1990s
• Military defeat in Chechnya in 1994-96 (though this was reversed in the second Chechen War)
• Inability to prevent NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999
• Inability to prevent NATO expansion, 1999-present
• The scuppering of the Mir Space Station in 2001
• Acceptance of US military deployments in Central Asia in 2001-02
• Withdrawal from Vietnam’s Cam Ranh naval base in 2002
• Inability to prevent US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002
• Inability to prevent Iraq war in 2003
• Inability to prevent terror attacks such as Moscow theatre siege and Beslan
• Inability to prevent ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan
• Inability to prevent Kosovo’s independence in 2008

These events - not to mention economic collapse and the debt default of 1998 - left Russia with a deep sense of humiliation. Only under the leadership of Vladimir Putin from 1999 has a sense of stability been restored. The economy is now growing at 7% a year, Russian business leaders are increasing their international profiles, and the central bank has amassed US$500bn of forex reserves, the third-largest such holdings on earth.

However, my own feeling is that Russia’s population decline will reduce its ability to regain superpower status. After the collapse of the USSR, Moscow ruled 149mn people. This number had fallen to 144mn by 2005, as very high death rates (due to alcoholism and reduced living standards) in post-Soviet Russia were accompanied by very low birth rates (due to despair and high rates of abortion). Consequently, the UN forecasts Russia’s population falling to 108mn by 2050 under its medium-variant scenario, a loss of 25%. Under its low variant scenario, the population would fall by 38% to 89mn.

These projections mean that Russia will have a reduced workforce, and a much smaller pool of young men available for military service. By contrast, the populations of Russia’s main geopolitical rivals will rise substantially. The US will have around 400mn people by 2050, Turkey around 100mn, and China 1.4bn. Moreover, the combined five Central Asian ‘stans’ will have almost 80mn by 2050, which will probably make them less willing to be subservient to a shrinking Russia. Of course, larger populations will not mean that the US, Turkey, etc. will expand their militaries accordingly. But bigger populations will mean bigger economies, and thus more resources available to channel towards military-industrial complexes.

The other main reason why I am sceptical that Russia will regain superpower status is its somewhat basic economy. Russia’s rapid growth is overwhelmingly being driven by energy exports. One former US diplomat recently described Russia as ‘Saudi Arabia with trees’. Indeed, as I have mentioned on Risk Watchdog lately, energy prices are at risk of sharper corrections, which could weigh on economic growth in future.

One wild card that might just help Russia is global climate change. A warmer Russia would make frosted and extremely cold areas in Siberia and elsewhere more habitable and suitable for agriculture and development. A new settlement of these areas could conceivably lead to a resurgence of Russia’s birth rates. However, this could take many years to accomplish, by which time Russia’s geopolitical rivals may have become much stronger.

Russia