Eight years after the ‘9/11’ terror attacks, the outcome of the subsequent ‘War on Terror’ is still inconclusive.

Overall, I have not really changed my view from the blog post I wrote on the seventh anniversary.

Neither ‘the West’ and its allied governments nor al-Qaeda and its offshoots have scored a decisive blow. In any case, as I pointed out last year, victory is difficult to define. For the West, is victory merely preventing further terror attacks, or is it purging the Muslim world of radical militants and anti-Western ideology? And what would constitute victory for al-Qaeda? Would this entail more massive attacks, or does it require the overthrow of pro-Western governments in the Muslim world and their replacement with theocracies?

For Western leaders, preventing further attacks is a success of sorts, but it would be foolish to publicly proclaim victory, for this achievement would immediately be nullified by a new terror attack. Also, the West is not the only target for Islamist militants; Russia and India are also targets, as are Western interests in Muslim countries, and many Muslim governments themselves. Indeed, regarding the latter, al-Qaeda needs to intimidate Muslim populations in order to force them to change their pro-Western leanings. That said, for al-Qaeda, striking the West would carry the most prestige, since it perceives the US and Europe as the ‘Far Enemy’.

Why The Lack Of 9/11-Scale Follow-On Attacks?

Significantly, there have been no terror attacks on the scale of 9/11 since then. Former US counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke penned a long article in the January/February 2005 issue of The Atlantic Monthly, in which he imagined he was delivering a lecture on the 10^th anniversary of 9/11. In his alternative timeline, the US went on to endure a decade of mass-casualty attacks that brought it to its knees. Yet thus far, none of his predictions have come true. Overall, there are three possible reasons why al-Qaeda has not struck on a massive scale again:

• Lack of capability: This is the most credible reason. Since 9/11, the March 2004 Madrid and July 2005 London attacks, and other atrocities elsewhere, international security has been stepped up sharply, and many new attack plans such as the 2006 ‘airlines’ plot have been foiled. In addition, al-Qaeda has lost its training bases in Afghanistan. Thus, while the intent to strike the West is there, the ability to do so may be severely constrained.

• Waiting for the right moment: There have been suggestions that al-Qaeda has the ability to strike the West, but is biding its time, for whatever reason. This is the least credible explanation. If anything, al-Qaeda needs to demonstrate its continued ability to strike, or it will lose credibility with its core supporters. The fact that Islamist militants first struck the World Trade Center in January 1993, then plotted multiple Trans-Pacific airliner bombings (Operation Bojinka) in 1995, and subsequently crafted numerous post-9/11 plots clearly demonstrate that the intent is there.

• Fear of consequences: Another theory is that al-Qaeda may be hesistant to carry out a new 9/11-scale attack for fear that the Western world would take drastic retaliation, such as an all-out invasion of Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, or even use nuclear weapons. Again, I do not find this credible, because various foiled plots demonstrate al-Qaeda’s willingness to aim big. Also, the fact that Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri have evaded capture demonstrates the limits of Western retaliatory capabilities.

Does Al-Qaeda Exist?

Another issue that must be considered in the ‘War on Terror’ is whether it even makes sense to talk about al-Qaeda as if it were a single unified entity. Islamist militants encompass diverse groups with diverse interests. Some are focused on the Palestinian issue, some on Kashmir, some on Chechnya, some on building a Southeast Asian caliphate consisting of Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, and some are Middle East-focused. In short, Islamist militants are diverse, because the Muslim world (another misleadingly all-encompassing term) is diverse. Thus, it will be difficult for the West to defeat Islamist militants, because they are not a single entity.

A 50-Year War?

A few years ago Western policymakers were talking about the ‘War on Terror’ as a 50-year war. Gazing ahead, I’d say the duration of this war very much depends on the drivers of radicalism in the Muslim world. These include:

• Widespread anger at Western policies (present and dating back decades if not centuries) towards the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere.

• Rapid social change amid urbanisation and the wide gap between traditionalism and modernity (for a concise and highly readable overview of these processes, read Occidentalism: A Short History Of Anti-Westernism).

• Rapid population increase, a demographic youth bulge, widespread unemployment and underemployment, and limited opportunities for upward social mobility.

These conditions are likely to prevail for some time, and it is not clear if rising middle classes will automatically alleviate anger, given that many key al-Qaeda operatives have highly educated and middle class backgrounds. There is also the fact that a small proportion of Muslims born and raised in the Western world are becoming radicalised. Three of the perpetrators of the 7/7 attacks were, after all, born in England. (For an overview of how British Muslims can become radicalised, read The Islamist by Ed Husain.)

Ultimately, the conclusion of the ‘War on Terror’ may have less to do with what the West does and more to do with social and economic progress in Muslim countries as a result of their own endogenous transformation. One potential driver of change could be increased education for women. In many other societies, this has been shown to reduce birth rates and the associated demographic pressures. This would also free up more of the population for economic participation, thus raising overall output.

Potential Boosters For Radical Islamist Forces

Meanwhile, a major problem for radical Islamist forces is that they lack a core country from which to project their global interests. Afghanistan was too small and too peripheral to serve this purpose, while Iran, a Persian and Shi’a nation, could not hope to lead the Arab world (the historic core of the Muslim world) or a predominantly (80%) Sunni Muslim world. Arguably, there are only three Muslim countries that are sufficiently powerful that their takeover by Islamist forces would make a real difference. These are:

• Egypt: the most populous Arab country with 72mn people and the cultural core of the Arab world; it is also arguably the birth place of modern Islamism.

• Saudi Arabia: the most prestigious country due to the presence of Islam’s holiest sites of Mecca and Medina; also the wealthiest in terms of oil reserves.

• Pakistan: the second-most populous Muslim country (after Indonesia) and the only one with confirmed nuclear weapons.

Yet despite years of dire predictions of revolutions in each of the above, their regimes have proved resilient. That does not mean they will last indefinitely, but so far the doomsayers have been wrong. That said, watch for further instability in Yemen, Russia’s North Caucasus, and Somalia. Lawlessness there could provide new bases for international terrorists.